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 Abstract. In most countries of the world where there is a strong 
western influence, there has been a persistent narrative that Iran is 
paranoid about the United States of America. It will not spare any grain 
to ensure the destruction of the mighty American nation. But 
according to the leaders of Iran, their actions are about the 
safeguarding of their country national security interest. Yet, there have 
been limited studies to respond to whether Iran is paranoid about the 
USA or if it is all about national security. Hence this study sought to 
illustrate the dangers of appeasing the USA when your national 
policies are in contract. The study selected a few countries and 
scenarios: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq-Iran war, the Axil of Evil phrase, 
Iraq, and Syria for the illustration. The study has shown that the USA 
will not relent to pursue its national interest against those opposing it, 
notwithstanding the consequences on the recipients. This USA trend 
will continue to manifest to the unforeseeable, thereby putting Iran in 
danger that befell other nations who had opposed the USA. Based on 
the findings, the study concludes that Iran is not paranoid about the 
USA but is concerned with preserving its national security and 
interests. 
Keywords: national security; paranoid; sanctions; terrorism; war. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
National security revolves around the neo-
realism ideals, according to which worldwide 
policies are mostly a struggle between states to 
acquire power under conditions of anarchy, as 
they contest for their national interests. In this 
environment, states are dependent on their mili-
tary supremacy to assure those interests, coun-
tering the threats arising from other states [21]. 
This way, national security is protected by dis-
tributing the balance of power and national sov-
ereignty between the different States. This tradi-
tional National Security ideal is the sustained ca-
pability of a country to pursue the advancement 
of its inner being without severe interference, or 
threat of interference, from foreign powers [24]. 
Therefore, national security has to be a state's 
ability to maintain its sovereignty and independ-
ence, assuring its people and protecting their 
properties. 
According to Gleeson, paranoia describes a "de-
structive-obstructive" personality that makes 
others feel uneasy, and whom themselves feel 
under threat and who does not perceive events 
at face value but instead is mistrustful of others 
and their motives and making wildly untrue alle-
gations [18]. Consequently, this kind of paranoia 
state is likely to be dangerous and violent. There-
fore, this study will be relating to whether Iran 
has these "destructive-obstructive" personality 
towards the USA or not. 
Sanctions have remained a significant element of 
USA policy on Iran ever since Iran's 1979 Islamic 
Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran, Mo-
hammad Reza Pahlavi, a critical American ally. 
The USA first enforced sanctions on Iran on 14th 
November 1979, freezing Iranian state assets in 
America in reaction to Iran's confiscation of the 
USA embassy and US diplomats in Tehran. In the 
following decades of the 1980s and 1990s, USA 
sanctions on Iraq were meant to attempt to co-
erce Iran to desist from being supportive of ter-
rorism acts and minimise Iran's strategic influ-
ence in the Middle East [11].  
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But strangely enough, during the 1980-88 Iran-
Iraq hostilities, the USA state often insisted that it 
was neutral in the war. However, the Reagan 
administration in January 1981 discretely per-
mitted Israelis, bitter foes of Saddam Hussein, to 
provide numerous billion dollars' worth of USA 
produced arms and spare parts to Iran [33]. 
During the 2014-17 "Operation Inherent Re-
solve", when the USA and its allies were fighting 
the Islamic militant ISIS, it is significant to re-
member that Iran played a crucial role in the 
fight. The Iranian army and its backed militias 
pushed ISIS back in Iraq and Syria [34]. The war-
fare was coordinated surgically without any inci-
dents of friendly fire from the sworn enemies. 
This notwithstanding that Iran was under sanc-
tions from the side, it gave a boost to this show-
cased the geopolitical power and influence ex-
tend of influence that the Shia powerhouse Teh-
ran held in the Middle East region.  
After the mid-2000s, the USA and some interna-
tional nations concentrated mainly on convincing 
Iran to approve to abandon its nuclear ambition. 
Hence, President Obama indicated that the USA 
allies in the Persian Gulf and Iran require to dis-
cover a practical way to share the neighbourhood 
and introduce some cold peace [36]. The Obama 
Administration in 2015 waived appropriate 
sanctions and annulled some executive orders 
(EOs). The remaining American sanctions were: 
USA trading with Iran, Iran's support for regional 
armed factions, Iran's human rights abuses, 
Iran's determinations to obtain missile and more 
developed conventional arms expertise [14]. The 
USA, European Union (EU) and other nations 
sought to retain the economic gains of the JCPOA, 
benefitting Iran to persuade Iran to remain in the 
nuclear accord and reduce her pursuit for the 
middle East domination. And Iran was baited to 
accept the 2015 multilateral nuclear accord due 
to the broad sanctions relief the arrangement 
brought. 
The Trump administration decided to discard the 
agreements made between the USA, its allies and 
Iran. It re-imposed by going beyond economic 
bounds, and included Iran's foreign minister Mo-
hammad Javad Zarif in its sanctions program, 
and labelled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group [39]. As all 
these transpired, Tehran continued in complete 
compliance with the JCPOA for an entire year af-
ter the USA had withdrawn from the accord [11; 
39]. The EU and other nations had strived to 
keep the economic gains of the JCPOA going to 
Iran to encourage Tehran to continue with the 
nuclear accord. But Tehran withdrew and con-
tinued to develop its missile armament while de-
clining to restart dialogues with the USA on a re-
viewed JCPOA.  
From the overview above, this relationship be-
tween Iran and the USA has undermined sanc-
tions as a diplomatic means, strengthening the 
beliefs of those in Tehran who certainly did not 
have faith in the commitment. And it has inspired 
the Iranian hardliners towards other aggressive 
Iranian national security policies. Notwithstand-
ing, there have also been incidents in the global 
politics and relations involving the USA that 
would keep any leader or most nations wary. The 
supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini must have 
learned from them over the years. Consequently, 
this paper sets out to discuss the incidents to Iran 
and the USA over the years to confirm whether 
Iran is paranoid of the USA or whether its na-
tional security guides it.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Vietnam Lesson 
The Vietnam War was a civil war between the 
pro-Western South and the communist North. 
Other countries, including the United States, in-
tervened, bolstering both sides, especially South 
Vietnam, with troops and armaments [38]. The 
practical American participation in the war 
commenced in 1954, although the continuing 
skirmish in the region had spread backwards for 
several decades. It followed the Japanese defeat 
in World War II in 1945, and Japan withdrew its 
military from Vietnam, conceding for the French-
educated Emperor Bao Dai to be in charge [17]. 
Looking to recapture the territory's charge, the 
French supported Bao Dai and set up Vietnam's 
nation in July 1949, with Saigon as the capital. 
Ho's Viet Minh forces saw a chance to grasp 
command and instantly rose and took over Ha-
noi's city and proclaimed the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam, with Ho as the president. But 
while the Soviets and Chinese supported Ho and 
his supporters to model their nation under com-
munism, Bao and many others supported a close 
economic and cultural Vietnamese tie to the capi-
talist [27]. The armed war between Ho's com-
munist military in the North and Bo's capitalist 
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army in the South was decided by Viet Minh's 
triumph in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 
1954. At a Geneva conference in July 1954, a trea-
ty was signed that split Vietnam along the lati-
tude known as the 17th Parallel (17 degrees 
north latitude), with Bao in control of the South 
and Ho in control in the North [32]. But both par-
ties were seeking the same objective of a unified 
Vietnam. 
As the Cold War heightened globally, the USA 
toughened its policies against the Soviet Union 
allies. In 1955, President Eisenhower guaranteed 
his support to Diem, the strongly anti-communist 
politician who had pushed Emperor Bao aside 
and South Vietnam. With guidance and materials 
from the USA armed forces and the CIA, Diem's 
military force hunted down those who sympa-
thised for Viet Minh, arresting thousands of peo-
ple, and many were viciously tortured and exe-
cuted [3]. The USA has permanently hardened its 
policies on whoever is not their ally, especially 
those who topple their allies. Ever since Iran's 
1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Shah of 
Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a critical Ameri-
can ally, it has always been a matter of when and 
not if. The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his administration will therefore 
not be waiting for a possibility of thousands of 
arrests, and many of whom will be brutally tor-
tured and executed, as was the case in Vietnam. 
Instead, the leaders in Tehran will be engaged in 
bolstering their national defences, not excluding 
the pursuance of weapons of mass destruction.  
During the 1957-60 period, Diem's many oppo-
nents, both communist and non-communist 
within South Vietnam, established resistance to 
his repressive regime. Washington thought that 
Hanoi was supporting it. Under the "domino the-
ory," which Washington held that, if any South-
east Asian nation leaned to communism, several 
others might follow, the USA committed a mili-
tary intervention [8]. But by 1962, the US mili-
tary presence in South Vietnam had reached 
some 9,000 troops, compared with fewer than 
800 during the 1950s [20]. The continued Irani-
an influence in the Persian Gulf might lead to the 
"domino effect" as other Middle East players fall 
to Iranianism, for example, the Houthis who are 
Zaydi Shiites, or the Zaydiyyah in Yemen, and the 
Hezbollah, the Shiite movement in Lebanon who 
became a role model and mentored for the 
Houthis. Therefore, this predisposes Iran to the 
USA, committing a large scale military intrusion 
to curtail it.  
The intrusion might also predispose Iran to the 
'Westmoreland policy' of attrition. The Ameri-
can-South Vietnamese battle in the South was 
battled predominantly on land, mainly under 
General William Westmoreland's leadership, in 
collaboration with General Nguyen Thieu's re-
gime, pursued a policy aimed at killing as many 
enemy soldiers as probable rather than striving 
to capture territories [12]. As a rational leader, 
Ayatollah Khomeini knows that they have a re-
sponsibility to protect their people and territory 
against what their enemy is known to be capable 
of undertaking. Therefore, Tehran bolsters its 
defences in what the western media refers to as 
aggressive measures. 
After years of war, approximately 2 million Viet-
namese died, whereas 3 million were injured, 
and an additional 12 million became refugees [6]. 
The war had entirely devastated the nation's in-
frastructure. The devastation of war is what most 
sensible leaders would pursue to prevent. They 
would achieve the same through deterrence and 
the mutual assurance of destruction of the ene-
my. For that reason, the pursuance of weapons of 
mass destruction and other clandestine manoeu-
vres are ways by which Tehran pursues to pre-
serve its million people and the nation's infra-
structure against the USA.  
 
The Afghanistan Lesson 
A USA and allied armed forces coalition intruded 
into Afghanistan weeks after the 11th September 
2001 coordinated strikes in the United States. 
The military campaign was against Al Qaeda and 
punished and ousted the Taliban government for 
harbouring and supporting Al-Qaeda leaders 
who were the mastermind [11]. The ultimate ob-
jective of USA determinations in Afghanistan was 
to ensure that the country is never used as a hub 
for planning and preparing attacks against the 
USA. But the incursion has left the country on the 
verge of irreparable destruction, which serves as 
a lesson to Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Following the departure of the Soviet military in 
1989, the nation descended into civil war as the 
Mujahedeen leaders turned on each other. The 
Afghans and the rest of the world, exhausted 
from persistent conflict, began to look to the Tal-
iban to restore order and security and create na-
tional reconciliation quickly. The Taliban en-
forced progressively stricter laws grounded in 
conservative understandings of Islam. Despite 
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the Taliban justice being bloody due to the impo-
sition of Sharia law enforced by the Taliban Reli-
gious Police, Afghans were moderately safe-
guarded from the physical insecurities of con-
flicts [16]. The Afghans' security was safeguarded 
on the frontiers of Severe Insecurity, Weakened 
Public Health System, Inaccessible Education, 
Climate-induced vulnerability and Forced Dis-
placement until the Taliban government was up-
rooted and replaced by the leaders who could 
not reconcile the whole country.  
According to the Advanced Training Program on 
Humanitarian Action, the civilian population in 
Afghanistan have been drawn in cycles of vio-
lence and destruction that have considerably dis-
torted the nation's economic, political and social 
structures [2]. Economic growth is crucial to Af-
ghanistan's long-term firmness, although there 
are mixed future development pointers. Years of 
conflict have inhibited the growth of most inter-
nal manufacturing establishments, including 
mining [11]. Nonetheless, Afghanistan's econom-
ic and political future still looks unclear, and in so 
way negative, due to continuing conflicts. 
The nation's security condition is more unstable 
and delicate currently than at the beginning of 
the USA incursion [30]. It has been estimated that 
complex suicide attacks are the primary source 
of civilian fatalities, mostly in urban regions.1 
These assaults are allegedly targeting the state 
and the USA and allies, but they instead result in 
many civilian casualties. Therefore, the citizens 
residing in town and cities are exposed to a re-
current upsurge in violence that interferes with 
their access to livelihoods services. The enduring 
targeting of civilians and the infrastructure has 
resulted in prevalent susceptibilities for people. 
This aspect has been widespread in the health 
sector due to intentional targeting of health 
amenities hence weakening an already weak 
health sector [1].  
Currently, Afghanistan is among the countries 
with the lowest literacy rates for the ages above 
15. The literacy rate of men at 62% and women 
at 18% (the median for developing countries is 
70% for males and 57% for females) [2]. Esti-
mates had indicated that, by the end of 2017, 
 
1 United Nations. (2018). The situation in Afghanistan and 




around 507,000 Afghans were to be forced to run 
away from their homes as a result of war over 
the year [10]. The war-affected zones have stimu-
lated most people to flee to urban areas, where 
possibilities of livelihoods and access to services 
are much higher.  
Since 2009, there had been a general certainty 
amongst the commentators that Afghanistan was 
headed towards disorder and that the USA and 
its allies lacked appropriate counterinsurgency 
(COIN) strategy [3]. From security to health, the 
citizens of Afghanistan are afflicted at every sin-
gle angle of their lives. Up to date, the USA and its 
allies have not been able to conceive a COIN ap-
proach. Consequently, the country broke down, 
and it has never stabilised. This serves as a good 
lesson for Tehran's leadership, who realised that 
a weakened military force would be a temptation 
for the USA and its allies to invade the country 
and never get to fix it. Therefore, in its pursuit of 
avoiding going the Afghanistan route, Iran has 
been labelled a rogue nation that is allegedly ob-
sessed with the USA's destruction. 
 
The Iran-Iraq War Lesson 
During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the USA gov-
ernment often insisted that it remained neutral. 
However, the Reagan government discretely re-
solved moments after taking office in January 
1981 to permit Israelis, bitter foes of Saddam 
Hussein, to supply numerous billion dollars' 
worth of USA manufactured weapons and spare 
parts to Iran [33]. That intervention and the re-
solve to assist Tehran aided it in disregarding ini-
tial expectations of a rapid Iraqi triumph and at-
taining significant achievements early in the con-
flict, which had commenced with an Iraqi assault 
in September 1980. 
In 1982, the Reagan Administration secretly re-
solved to hand over highly classified information 
to President Saddam Hussein. They also author-
ised the USA-made war weapons to assist Iraq in 
forestalling an impending loss in Iran's conflict. 
The USA decision to supply pivotal help to Bagh-
dad was reached after the USA intelligence or-
ganisations cautioned that Baghdad was on the 
brink of actually being overrun by Tehran, whose 
military had been reinforced the year earlier by 
clandestine cargoes of the USA-made weapons 
[33].  
The Americans were supplying both parties to 
ensure that neither party domineers the strategic 
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oil region. And it resulted in enormous loss of 
human lives, billions of dollars of expenses and 
depleted infrastructures for both the feuding na-
tions. When nations are not distinctively militari-
ly strong, they are vulnerable to manipulation by 
the USA for its benefits, for instance, ensuring its 
uninterrupted oil supplies. That is a lesson that 
Tehran learned, and it has been trying to rectify it 
so that, now and in future, it will not be manipu-
lated to engage in a non-decisive war where it is 
relying on a discreet external supply of weapons. 
On Thursday, 20th September 2001, President 
Bush of the United States of America, while ad-
dressing a joint session of Congress and the na-
tion, drew a red line by telling the world that, "Ei-
ther you are with us or you are with the terror-
ists". The assumption was that the division be-
tween Us and Them had been equated with the 
division between Good and Evil. Consequently, in 
such a dualistic impression of the world, the USA 
represents Good and that anything it chooses to 
undertake is Good. In contrast, all others that of-
fend or inconveniences it are Evil [19].  
In less than five months after the 11th September 
2001 Al-Qaeda attacks in Washington and New 
York, President Bush, in the 2002 State of the Un-
ion Address, made a proclamation referring to 
three nations: Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as "axis 
of evil". According to Bush, these three rogue na-
tions financed, harboured and aided terrorists 
and subsequently threatened the world's peace. 
Hence, this idiom of "axis of evil" characterised a 
hallmark of Bush's government foreign policy, 
even though none of the attackers was citizens of 
the three nations [37]. 
Granting Iran membership in the 'Axis of Evil' 
was probably first, the usage of the phrase Axis of 
Evil was a redefining of the American "War on 
Terror," as it shifted focus from Osama bin Laden 
and Al-Qaeda together with their allies and bases, 
whose association ranged from minimal to non-
existent [19]. The Shiite cleric's general hostility 
to the United States (opposition to Good must 
necessarily be Evil) that Tehran does not recog-
nise the Palestinians' struggle against the Israelis 
as constituting terrorism, and explicitly it's back-
ing of Hezbollah. After Shiite clerics gripped au-
thority during the 1979 revolution, Iran became 
a wealthy nation supporter of 'terrorism' in its 
ability [9]. 
Second, it also shifted focus on those possessing 
chemical and biological weapons because they 
could sell or give them to terrorists to attack 
Americans. Ironically, those already possessing 
nuclear weapons are immune from an imminent 
American attack, for instance, Pakistan, whose 
military intelligence service was the main backer 
of the Taliban, and perhaps North Korea [19]. 
Hence the focus is primarily on the states pos-
sessing chemical and biological weapons and 
may, in the future, acquire nuclear weapons. 
They may, in the future, perhaps be tempted to 
give or sell to terrorists. Under these criteria, Iran 
qualifies that it is considered a rogue state, has 
chemical and biological weapons and strives to 
achieve a nuclear program.  
Third, the division between Us and Them had 
been equated with the division between good 
and Evil. Consequently, in such a dualistic im-
pression of the world, the USA represents the en-
forcer of Good and that anything it chooses to 
undertake is Good. In contrast, all others that of-
fend or inconveniences it are Evil [19]. Because 
Iran is pursuing its divergent aspirations and phi-
losophies, it is an evil that must be overcome. 
 
The Iraq Lesson 
In approximately five months after the 11th Sep-
tember 2001 coordinated attacks on Washington 
and New York, President Bush in 2002 pro-
claimed referring to three states: Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea, as "axis of evil". The phrase "axis of 
evil" consequently was confined to perceived 
hostile countries that may, at some time in the 
future, attain nuclear weapons which they may, 
at some time in the future, perhaps be tempted to 
offer to terrorists [19].  
By mid-September 2002, officials in the USA and 
her allies had impressed their leadership that 
Iraq was in pursuance of weapons of mass de-
struction. It was alleged that there was evidence 
of Iraqi development of ballistic missiles during 
that time, its ability to produce biological weap-
ons in a mobile laboratory and of chemical capa-
bilities [4]. If the USA were going to change Iraq's 
establishment, it would create a new blueprint of 
democracy in the Middle East [15]. Iran most def-
initely qualified under these criteria in that it has 
a nuclear program, and its rhetoric and actions 
have never proved that it will not offer out these 
weapons. The same can be said of Iraq. 
The Iraq war, sometimes known as the "Iraqi 
Freedom Operation", began on 20th March 2003, 
with the USA and its allies' incursion into Iraq. 
The War in Iraq brought to reality what a super-
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2021. Vol. 7, No 3  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   1013 
power in a region can and cannot achieve. The 
world watched as a regional superpower was 
gradually weakened in its self-image and before 
the world. The National Intelligence Estimate of 
January 2007 on Iraq published a blatant depic-
tion of a polarised and violent state overwhelmed 
by acts of terror, an insurgency, a widespread 
unorganised and organised criminality, a civil 
war and a failed state [31]. Whether an individual 
approves of America's assault on Iraq, it is evi-
dent that its mismanagement has borne a civil 
war that has left any little military or political al-
ternatives. 
The current American administration emphasis-
es that Iran has the burden to prove that it is not 
pursuing after acquiring nuclear weapons and 
that neither the USA nor the UN needs to prove 
that Tehran does not have those ambitions. This 
is precisely the situation Saddam Hussein found 
himself before the trumpets of war sounded that 
left Iraq in turmoil. And subsequently, it was al-
leged that any evidence presented was fake [19]. 
It should be remembered that every measure the 
UN ever took against Baghdad with the inclusion 
of the cease-fire after the Gulf war, the inspec-
tions regime, and sanctions had been binding on 
every member of the world body as a matter of 
international law [23]. Did Tehran learn any les-
son from the history of America dealing with 
Saddam Hussein? The leaders in Tehran must 
have caught a lesson or several, and the lessons 
are currently informing their relation and han-
dling of the USA. 
 
The Syrian Lesson 
State of the Union speech by Bush in 2002 listed 
Iran and Iraq, and North Korea as part of Evil's 
axis. During that year, John Bolton, the then un-
der-secretary of state, included Syria to the list 
[7]. The USA also declared Syria as a target for 
regime change [29]. The fear that the USA and its 
allies would switch their focus to topple their 
governments after they were finished with Iraq 
pushed the Syrians and Iranians to increase se-
curity collaboration with one another. They also 
began supporting diverse insurgent blocs in Iraq 
to preoccupy the USA military not to be attacked 
[35]. 
Fast forward, on 17th December 2010, Al-Tayeb 
Bouazizi, a Tunisian vegetable retailer, set him-
self ablaze outside a government building to pro-
test against corruption. Bouazizi's self-
immolation catalysed uprisings in the months 
that followed, first in Tunisia and then in Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen in what is 
popularly known as the Arab uprising [35]. As 
Syria slide into civil conflict in the coming years, 
the CIA began to train and arm some Syrian re-
bels [22] secretly. Although Washington coordi-
nated to support specific rebel forces in the Syri-
an civil war, they were fighting ISIS and at the 
same time waging war on Assad in Syria, even 
when ISIS was battling Bashar al-Assad [28]. 
Therefore, they battled ISIS to weaken them from 
battling with Syria, whereas Syria was battling 
the USA supported allies. This may sound insane, 
but it is insane for the reason that it is outra-
geous. But the same is not outrageous for the 
American policymakers who were being in-
formed by their own 'national security. That na-
tional security they were pursuing had already 
blared to Tehran leadership that, when the USA 
and the allies are finished with Syria, they will get 
involved in Iran.  
Consequently, Iran will be expected to bolster its 
economic, political, cultural, religious, and mili-
tary values in anticipation of a direct attack or 
proxy attacks from the USA and its allies. Tehran 
has been sending special forces, agents, weapons, 
and nonmilitary support to Damascus. And the 
Iran-supported Lebanese Hezbollah had dis-
patched advisers and then military units to help 
Al-Assad clump on the uprising [25; 40]. And in 
case of a protracted stalemate in the civil war, 
then Syria might perish a slow death, as the re-
bels control some areas and others held by the 
government [26]. The rebels sponsored by the 
USA and its allies are as tough to beat as a nation-
state. 
Food security in Syria is seriously destabilised 
due to infrastructure damage and massive popu-
lation displacement, which has left more than 
half of the population living in poverty [5]. Due to 
the current stalemate in the war, the situation in 
Syria is desperate. Just to quote David Lesch, pro-
fessor of history at Trinity University in San An-
tonio, Texas. 
"Putrid piles of garbage lie on streets because 
basic services have ceased operating. Running 
water and electricity are either unavailable – by 
design, as a form of collective punishment, or due 
to disruption – or else are available only sporadi-
cally. Storefronts are shuttered, battered and 
broken. The stores themselves are empty of both 
people and products, as either the retailers have 
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deliberately removed the stock, storing it for a 
safer day, or else – more likely – vandals have pil-
fered the goods on one or either side of the con-
flict. Shells and bullets pockmark the walls of 
buildings. Many streets are deserted, littered 
with debris and marked with the occasional 
bloodstain" [26]. 
Civil warfare continues to impact Syria, which is 
currently a playground for both the state and 
non-state actors. The Syrian conflict is no longer 
a clear situation of one party battling the other. 
Consequently, Iran is not paranoid but is in-
formed by its need for self-preservation, not de-
siring to go the Syrian way. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The dualistic East-West division disappeared and 
was substituted by a divide between states 
committed to the USA and the "rogue nations" 
with divergent aspirations and philosophies. 
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, China, Syria, Russia and 
Sudan were in the latter camp. Each one had pos-
session or aspired to possess 'weapons of mass 
destruction, and they were labelled as sponsors 
of terrorism. Consequently, defending and deter-
ring against rogue nations has historically been a 
national security objective of the USA and its al-
lies. Since the end of World War Two, the USA 
has been embroiled in civil wars, revolutions, and 
political uprisings in nonaligned and third world 
countries on the pretext that it has strategic, eco-
nomic, and ideological interests the regions [8]. 
In the current neo-realism world, Iran cannot 
trust the USA, as shown from the discussion and 
must always be prepared to gear up for conflict. 
Iran can only act to serve moral purposes when 
its security interests are not being threatened. Its 
scepticism should be filled the USA and allies 
producing more "just and humane policies". 
There is no nation on earth desiring to be bur-
dened or yearning for enslavement as it peaceful-
ly looks forward to the night bombs and inva-
sions into its territory. Consequently, Iran is not 
paranoid of the USA but is concerned that its na-
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